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CONFLICT PREEMPTION: A REMEDY FOR THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT OF CRIME-FREE NUISANCE ORDINANCES
Meredith Joseph*
ABSTRACT
Thousands of municipalities across the country have adopted crime-free 
nuisance ordinances—laws that sanction landlords for their tenants’ behaviors, 
coercing them to evict tenants for actions as innocuous as calling 9-1-1 in an 
emergency. These facially neutral ordinances give wide discretion to municipal 
officials, leading to discriminatory enforcement of evictions. As a result, these 
ordinances have a devastating impact on victims of domestic violence and are 
used as a tool to inhibit integration in majority-white municipalities. Many 
plaintiffs have brought lawsuits alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution and 
the Fair Housing Act. However, bringing lawsuits under various anti-
discrimination protections presents many challenges. Less than five percent of all 
discrimination plaintiffs will achieve relief, and eighty-six percent of 
discrimination claims end in dismissals.
1
Professor Katie Eyer, an anti-
discrimination legal scholar, has advocated for increasing the use of “extra-
discrimination remedies,” litigation-based approaches that are not rooted in anti-
discrimination laws.
2
This Note explores one potential extra-discrimination 
remedy that could be used to challenge crime-free nuisance ordinances: conflict 
preemption. Crime-free nuisance ordinances that are not tailored to state landlord-
tenant laws’ grounds for eviction may be in conflict with, and preempted by, state 
law. This Note also recommends that fair housing advocates collaborate with 
landlord associations when challenging crime-free nuisance ordinances. Although 
the interests of landlords and tenants often conflict, both groups are harmed by 
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of September 24, 2011, Rosetta Watson was 
asleep in her bed when her former boyfriend, Robert Hennings, 
knocked on her door.3 She awoke and told him that he was not 
welcome inside.4 Mr. Hennings then broke down Ms. Watson’s 
door, entered her bedroom, and punched her in the face.5 Ms. 
3. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 42, 45, Watson v. City of Maplewood, No 4:17-cv-1268 
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2017) [hereinafter First Amended Watson Complaint].
4. Id. ¶ 45.
5. Id.
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Watson fled her apartment and called the police.6 The police ar-
rested Mr. Hennings for assault, but he was released shortly after 
and the abuse continued.7 Ms. Watson was a victim of repeated 
domestic violence; between September 2011 and February 2012, 
she called the police for help four times.8 Unbeknownst to her, the 
municipality where she lived was keeping a tally of these calls.9
Ms. Watson lived in Maplewood, a small municipality in St. Louis 
County. A Maplewood ordinance authorizes the removal of resi-
dents from their homes if they are deemed a “nuisance.”10 When 
Ms. Watson lived in Maplewood, the definition of nuisance en-
compassed a wide range of activities, including more than two in-
stances in six months of domestic violence resulting in police 
calls.11 Though the Maplewood city officials were aware that Ms. 
Watson was a victim of domestic violence, they deemed her a nui-
sance, revoked her residency permit, and forced her out of her 
home.12 Ms. Watson is not the only domestic violence survivor to be 
re-victimized by her city’s nuisance ordinance.13 Around 2,000 mu-
nicipalities across the country have adopted crime-free nuisance 
ordinances similar to Maplewood’s.14
Crime-free nuisance ordinances give municipalities the power to 
interfere with a private lease contract and force landlords to evict 
certain tenants at the municipalities’ discretion. Like Maplewood, 
municipalities often justify their crime-free nuisance ordinances as 
necessary to prevent properties from deteriorating and to provide
a safe and peaceful community.15 However, these facially neutral 
6. Id. ¶ 46.
7. Id. ¶¶ 46–58.
8. We Live Here: Nuisance, or Nonsense? (Part 1), ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO, at 11:11 (Apr. 26, 
2018), https://www.welivehere.show/nuisance-or-nonsense-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/2WCM-
XP7G].
9. Id. at 11:26.
10. Christine Hauser, Woman Abused by Boyfriend Sues City for Evicting Her as Nuisance,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/us/aclu-domestic-
violence-st-louis.html [https://perma.cc/DE3L-U24M].
11. Alisha Jarwala & Sejal Singh, When Disability Is a “Nuisance”: How Chronic Nuisance 
Ordinance Push Residents with Disabilities Out of Their Homes, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 875,
879–80 (2019).
12. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 64–75. Maplewood requires res-
idents to obtain “occupancy” or “residency” permits in order to live in the city. See Applica-
tions and Permits, MAPLEWOOD MO., https://www.cityofmaplewood.com/59/Forms-and-
Documents [https://perma.cc/9CFW-CLBL]. Maplewood’s municipal code allows the city 
to revoke individuals’ occupancy permits if they are deemed a nuisance. MAPLEWOOD, MO.,
MUN. CODE §§ 34-240(18); 34-242(2)(e), (h) (2020).
13. See discussion infra Section I.B.
14. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 878.
15. Jenny Simeone-Casas, From Complaint to Eviction, Here’s How the Maplewood Nuisance 
Ordinance Works, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (June 15, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://news.
stlpublicradio.org/post/complaint-eviction-heres-how-maplewood-nuisance-ordinance-works
#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5AUX-EBYC].
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ordinances create a powerful mechanism for controlling the mu-
nicipality’s demographics. While much of the litigation and media 
advocacy efforts to combat crime-free nuisance ordinances focus 
on their disparate impact on domestic violence victims, reform ef-
forts have paid less attention to the potential impact on Black fami-
lies with children and the use of these ordinances as a tool to pre-
vent integration in majority-white municipalities. In St. Louis 
County, the problems with crime-free nuisance ordinances do not 
end with Maplewood and Ms. Watson. A recent study found that 
sixty-nine of the eighty-eight St. Louis County municipalities have
crime-free nuisance ordinances in effect.16 Some jurisdictions in St. 
Louis County specifically target renters by excluding owner-
occupied homes from the ordinances.17 Since only twenty-seven 
percent of white families in St. Louis rent their homes, compared 
to almost sixty percent of Black families, there is great potential for 
a racially disparate impact.18 “[R]acial disparities in the criminal 
justice system,” combined with crime-free nuisance ordinances,
have had the “effect of promoting segregation” and “creating hous-
ing instability for vulnerable populations.”19
Part I of this Note discusses the history and discriminatory na-
ture of crime-free nuisance ordinances, highlighting two signifi-
cant problems: (1) disproportionate eviction of domestic violence 
survivors, and (2) preventing integration in majority-white munici-
palities. Part II discusses litigation strategies using anti-
discrimination laws to fight crime-free nuisance ordinances and 
the limitations of these strategies. Part III proposes an extra-
discrimination litigation strategy, exploring the possibility of chal-
lenging these ordinances under conflict preemption doctrine.
16. Blythe Bernhard, Letters Sent to Six St. Louis County Municipalities Over ‘Problematic’
Nuisance Ordinances, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com
/news/local/metro/letters-sent-to-six-st-louis-county-municipalities-over-problematic
/article_1bf750a7-89d2-567e-9663-10e5c292b8ea.html [https://perma.cc/S4MX-2U8G]. St. 
Louis has eighty-eight municipalities. St. Louis County Municipalities and Better Together: 4 
Things to Know, ST. LOUIS MAG. (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.stlmag.com/news/politics/st-
louis-county-municipalities-better-together/ [https://perma.cc/NWC4-TMTH].
17. Kalila J. Jackson, Dismantling the Divide: Crime Free Nuisance Ordinances Are a Public 
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances
Thousands of municipalities across the country have adopted 
crime-free nuisance ordinances.20 Crime-free nuisance ordinances 
are laws that sanction landlords for their tenants’ behaviors and of-
ten coerce landlords to “abate” the nuisance by evicting tenants.21
These ordinances usually identify certain conditions or conduct 
that deem a property a “nuisance.”22 “Nuisance” behavior is often 
vaguely defined and can range from “disruptive conduct”23 and 
“lewd and lascivious behavior”24 to violent crime and drug-related 
felonies.25 Crime-free nuisance ordinances can be triggered even 
without a conviction.26 In many municipalities, a property with an 
“excessive” number of 9-1-1 calls will also be deemed a nuisance.27
Additionally, crime-free nuisance ordinances typically employ a vi-
carious liability scheme, meaning that the behavior of any member 
of the household, their guests, or another person under the resi-
dent’s control can trigger the ordinance.28 If landlords fail to 
“abate” the nuisance, they face sanctions including fines, revoca-
tion of their renter’s license, or even imprisonment.29
Crime-free nuisance ordinances are a type of third-party com-
munity policing.30 Third-party policing privatizes police responsibil-
ities by placing the onus on landlords to deal with tenants whom 
the community deems problematic.31 Some cities, like Milwaukee, 
explicitly state that the purpose of crime-free nuisance ordinances 
is to shift the cost of policing from taxpayers to landlords.32 Propo-
nents of the ordinances also claim that the policies are “designed 
20. Sandra S. Park, Stopping Evictions Caused by Nuisance Ordinances, in NAT’L L. CTR. ON 
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, PROTECT TENANTS, PREVENT HOMELESSNESS 28 (2018), 
https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ProtectTenants2018.pdf.
21. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 877–78.
22. Sandra Park & Michaela Wallin, Local Nuisance Ordinances: Penalizing the Victim, Un-
dermining Communities?, MUN. LAW. MAG., May/June 2015, at 6, https://imla.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/article-1755.pdf.
23. Id.
24. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.454 (2019).
25. Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 847 (2015).
26. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(A)(4) (2019).
27. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 879.
28. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(A)(4) (2019).
29. Park & Wallin, supra note 22, at 7.
30. Anna Kastner, The Other War at Home: Chronic Nuisance Laws and the Revictimization of 
Survivors of Domestic Violence, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1047, 1063 (2015).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1064 (explaining that shifting policing to landlords saves the city money by 
reducing resources spent in responding to emergency calls).
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to reduce crime, drugs, and gangs on apartment properties”33 and 
that municipalities enacting these ordinances benefit from “re-
duced police calls for service, a more stable resident base, and re-
duced exposure to civil liability.”34
Using nuisance ordinances to privatize police responsibilities is 
not a new phenomenon. Nuisance ordinances have regulated ten-
ant behavior since the 1980s, when panic over crime rates and 
drug usage began to spread across communities.35 It was then that 
municipalities began requiring landlords to evict their residents for 
criminal and noncriminal offenses.36 Like the 1986 “War on Drugs” 
legislation, nuisance ordinances are “race neutral” in theory but 
not in enforcement.37 The discretionary nature of crime-free nui-
sance ordinances permits racially-targeted enforcement, leading to 
disparate racial impact.38
Though crime-free nuisance ordinances seem confined to indi-
vidual municipalities, their pervasive nature has created a national 
problem.39 Crime-free nuisance ordinances have spread to forty-
eight states40 and around 2,000 municipalities41—over ten percent 
of all municipalities in the United States.42 They are not limited to 
large cities, either; small towns and mid-sized cities across the 
country have enacted crime-free nuisance ordinances.43




35. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1060.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1061.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1056.
40. INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, supra note 33.
41. Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 878. In 2013, the Shriver Center on Poverty Law 
released a report finding that more than one hundred municipalities in Illinois have enact-
ed crime-free nuisance ordinances. EMILY WERTH, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY 
L., THE COST OF BEING “CRIME FREE”: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE 
RENTAL HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY ORDINANCES 1 (2013), http://www.poverty
law.org/files/docs/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95L-G62S]. When the 
New York Civil Liberties Union surveyed forty of the state’s most populous municipalities 
outside of New York City, it found that twenty-five of those cities had crime-free nuisance 
ordinances. SCOUT KATOVICH, N.Y. C.L. UNION, MORE THAN A NUISANCE: THE OUTSIZED 
CONSEQUENCE OF NEW YORK’S NUISANCE ORDINANCES 10 (2018), https://www.
nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/nyclu_nuisancereport_20180809.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9Z6-PS5T].
42. See Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, NAT’L LEAGUE OF 
CITIES, https://web.archive.org/web/20201013211310/https://www.nlc.org/number-of-
municipal-governments-population-distribution (stating that there are 19,492 municipalities 
in the United States).
43. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1056.
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B. Harmful Impact of Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances on 
Domestic Violence Survivors
Crime-free nuisance ordinances have received national attention 
for their devastating impact on victims of domestic violence.44
When the Maplewood City Council enforced its crime-free nui-
sance ordinance against Ms. Watson, she was forced out of her 
home45 and barred from entering Maplewood for six months.46
With nowhere to go, Ms. Watson had to place her items in stor-
age.47 But this was only a small part of the harm the ordinance 
caused her. Ms. Watson’s eviction and prohibition from entering 
Maplewood prevented her from visiting her doctor,48 caused her to 
lose her Section 8 Voucher,49 and left her homeless and seeking 
shelter in a vacant building.50 Eventually, Ms. Watson moved back 
to the City of St. Louis, where she continued to face domestic 
abuse—the same ex-boyfriend found her at a bus stop and stabbed 
her.51 After facing this seemingly endless chain of traumatic events, 
Ms. Watson filed a federal lawsuit against Maplewood to challenge 
the ordinance.52
Crime-free nuisance ordinances have re-victimized many women 
like Ms. Watson. In 2012 in Norristown, Pennsylvania, Lakisha 
Briggs refused to call the police after her former boyfriend stabbed 
her in the neck because she knew another 9-1-1 call would leave 
her and her three-year-old daughter homeless.53 After a neighbor 
saw her injury and called for an ambulance, Ms. Briggs was airlifted 
to a trauma unit.54 Three days later, Norristown city officials re-
44. See ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, SILENCED: HOW NUISANCE ORDINANCES 
PUNISH CRIME VICTIMS IN NEW YORK 4 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files
/field_document/equ15-report-nuisanceord-rel3.pdf.
45. ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO, supra note 8, at 13:43–13:48.
46. Id. at 14:03–14:17.
47. Id. at 13:43–13:48.
48. Id. at 14:03–14:17.
49. Id. at 14:22–14:36.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 14:40–14:58.
52. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3. The § 1983 claim alleged that 
Maplewood violated Ms. Watson’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Missouri 
state constitution’s equivalent protections. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. The parties in Watson settled on 
September 11, 2018. Rosetta Watson v. City of Maplewood, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org
/cases/rosetta-watson-v-maplewood [https://perma.cc/A6TK-WTQX] (last updated Apr. 
10, 2017). Maplewood agreed to pay Ms. Watson $137,000 as compensation for the damages 
caused to her. Release and Settlement Agreement at 1, Watson v. City of Maplewood, No.
4:17-cv-1268 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/watson-v-
maplewood-settlement. The city also agreed to amend the nuisance ordinance. Id. at 2. Sig-
nificantly, Maplewood added an exception for victims and now forbids enforcement against 
persons who call the police or call for emergency services. Id. at Exhibit A, ¶ 18.
53. See Kastner, supra note 30, at 1048.
54. Id.
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voked her landlord’s rental license and said he must evict Ms. 
Briggs within ten days.55 In 2014, in Surprise, Arizona, Nancy 
Markham called the police after her ex-boyfriend choked her, 
punched her, and threatened her with weapons. Subsequently, a 
city police officer enforced the town nuisance ordinance and told 
Ms. Markham’s landlord to evict her.56
Because victims of domestic violence call emergency services 
more frequently than other groups, their calls disproportionately 
trigger nuisance ordinance enforcement.57 One study surveyed
every nuisance citation distributed in Milwaukee between 2008 and 
2009.58 The study found that 3.8% of all 9-1-1 calls concerned do-
mestic violence, yet domestic violence was the reason for 15.7% of 
all nuisance designations.59 These domestic violence incidents re-
sulted in 157 citation letters.60 Landlords responded in eighty-six of 
these citations.61 In over half of their responses, the landlords initi-
ated formal or informal eviction proceedings, and in 83% of cases 
the landlord “relied on either eviction or threat of eviction for fu-
ture police calls.”62
This sort of response from landlords forces domestic violence 
survivors to choose between their housing and their safety, as they 
know that calling the police on an abusive partner may lead to 
eviction and homelessness.63 Women of color and poor women are 
more likely to face this impossible choice and experience the nega-
tive impacts of these crime-free nuisance ordinances.64
C. Majority-White Municipalities Use Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances to 
Prevent Integration
In addition to the harm crime-free nuisance ordinances cause 
domestic violence survivors, the ordinances also harm Black fami-
55. Id. at 1048–49.
56. Nancy Markham v. City of Surprise, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/nancy-
markham-v-city-surprise [https://perma.cc/4X37-USEJ] (last updated Jan. 30, 2015).
57. ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 44, at 4.
58. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-
Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117 (2012).
59. Id. at 131.
60. Id. at 132.
61. Id. at 133.
62. Id.
63. Amanda K. Gavin, Chronic Nuisance Ordinances: Turning Victims of Domestic Violence 
Into “Nuisances” in the Eyes of Municipalities, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 257, 267 (2014).
64. See Kastner, supra note 30, at 1053–56. For example, a study in Milwaukee found 
that the likelihood a property receives a nuisance citation due to domestic violence increas-
es with the percentage of Black residents in the neighborhood. Desmond & Valdez, supra
note 58, at 137 (detailing that the study controlled for both domestic violence calls made 
from properties and neighborhoods’ domestic violence rates).
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lies by preventing integration in predominantly white neighbor-
hoods. As people of color move to smaller cities and suburbs, mu-
nicipalities have passed crime-free nuisance ordinances to dispro-
portionately police and evict Black families.65 In Faribault, 
Minnesota, the Black population nearly tripled between 2000 and 
2010 and residents complained about increased criminal activity.66
Though police records did not support these claims, in 2014 the 
city passed a crime-free ordinance to get rid of “problem tenants” 
living in downtown Faribault.67
Two common features of crime-free nuisance ordinances make 
them particularly effective tools to prevent integration. First, they 
allow discretionary enforcement by police officers and city officials. 
Second, they make tenants vicariously liable for the actions of oth-
ers.
Police are often given broad discretion to selectively enforce 
vague ordinances, resulting in biased implementation that dispro-
portionately impacts communities of color.68 In Antioch, Califor-
nia, a historically majority-white city with a growing Black popula-
tion, the city created a police unit to surveil alleged nuisances, 
particularly on rental properties.69 Antioch gave officers nearly un-
limited discretion to choose the locations to investigate.70 Rather 
than solely focusing on nuisances, the unit closely watched Black 
families, searching their homes without warrants and investigating 
their private lives.71 Officers in Antioch disproportionately policed 
Black tenants receiving Section 8 Vouchers who lived in majority-
white neighborhoods.72 Broad discretionary powers and vague 
65. Rachel Smith, Policing Black Residents as Nuisances: Why Selective Nuisance Law En-
forcement Violates the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 87, 96 (2018). One 
Ohio study found that crime-free nuisance ordinances were primarily passed to penalize 
people of color whose behavior was perceived as disruptive, rather than out of concern for 
crime. Id. at 99 (citing JOSEPH MEAD, MEGAN E. HATCH, J. ROSIE TIGHE, MARISSA PAPPAS,
KRISTI ANDRASIK & ELIZABETH BONHAM, WHO IS A NUISANCE? CRIMINAL ACTIVITY NUISANCE 
ORDINANCES IN OHIO 3 (2017), https://www.clevescene.com/media/pdf/cano_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3AL8-NTCG] (“Rarely do resident express concern with serious crime. 
Instead, residents and councilmembers complain about annoying or rude behavior and 
their wish for a certain community character. Race and class undertones are frequently evi-
dent.”)).
66. Deborah Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free Hous-
ing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 199 (2019).
67. Id. Faribault’s crime-free nuisance ordinance specifically targets rental housing, and 
nearly all of the Black families in downtown Faribault rent their homes. Notably, the ordi-
nance exempts single-family dwellings occupied by a relative of the owner—an exemption 
that is far more likely to shield white people from the consequences of the crime-free ordi-
nance. Id. at 200.
68. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1065–66.
69. Smith, supra note 65, at 100.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 101.
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crime-free nuisance ordinances allow for disproportionate en-
forcement reflecting the prejudices and implicit biases of individu-
al officials.73 With the widespread use of discretionary nuisance 
laws, it is no surprise that Black residents in racially integrated 
neighborhoods have the highest rates of nuisance citations.74
Crime-free nuisance ordinances also disproportionately harm 
Black families because the ordinances often apply vicarious liabil-
ity. This means tenants may be evicted for actions they were only 
tangentially connected to through their social or familial relation-
ships.75 For example, in Florissant in St. Louis County, the nuisance 
ordinance states that a landlord’s residential rental license “may be 
suspended or revoked if any member of the household, guest or 
another person under the resident’s control” commits a criminal 
activity or municipal offense.76 Littering, possession of marijuana, 
and violating the city curfew for any person under seventeen are all 
municipal offenses that could lead to eviction.77 With the ordi-
nance’s broad-sweeping vicarious liability, entire families could be 
evicted based on the actions of one member.78
This expansive vicarious liability overwhelmingly affects low-
income households where one woman supports the family and her 
adolescent son engages in an illegal activity.79 These families may 
be forced to exclude their children from the home to minimize 
the risk of eviction.80 Black families are especially at risk because 
Black adolescent males are over-policed and arrested at much 
higher rates than their white peers.81 As a result, Black families are
more likely to be forced to choose between (a) excluding a child 
73. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1066–67.
74. Smith, supra note 65, at 99.
75. Swan, supra note 25, at 845–46.
76. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(A)(4) (2019).
77. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 605.461(A)(4)(h) (2019), 210.530 (2020) (litter-
ing), 210.1800 (2020) (possession of marijuana), 210.1980, (2020) (curfew violations).
78. Theresa Langley, Living Without Protection: Nuisance Property Laws Unduly Burden In-
nocent Tenants and Entrench Divisions Between Impoverished Communities and Law Enforcement, 52 
HOUS. L. REV. 1255, 1278 (2015).
79. Id. at 1279.
80. See Swan, supra note 25, at 857–58.
81. See Who Are You Calling a Nuisance?: How Nuisance Ordinances Discriminate Against 
Families With Children, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.: AMICUS BLOG (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://harvardcrcl.org/who-are-you-calling-a-nuisance-how-nuisance-ordinances-
discriminate-against-families-with-children/ [https://perma.cc/YZ4Z-KZS5]; see also Smith, 
supra note 65, at 99–100 (noting that in 2005, Bedford, Ohio passed a crime-free nuisance 
ordinance shortly after the population shifted from majority-white to majority-Black. The 
Mayor stated that the ordinance’s purpose was to “police ‘predominantly African American 
kids who bring in [a] mentality from the inner city.’ ” (citing MEAD, ET AL., supra note 65, at 
4)).
SPRING 2021] Conflict Preemption 811
from the home to avoid eviction and (b) keeping the family to-
gether but losing their home.82
Preventing integration was likely one of the driving factors be-
hind Maplewood’s nuisance ordinance,83 where the majority white 
suburb84 forced Rosetta Watson, a Black woman, out of her home. 
This rationale also likely explains why Florissant, whose white pop-
ulation dropped from 70.3% in 201085 to 57.6% in 2017,86 enacted 
its broad-sweeping, vicarious-liability nuisance ordinance in 2016.87
As more Black families moved into Florissant, the City enacted a
sweeping crime-free nuisance ordinance—exemplifying how many 
majority-white municipalities are dealing with the threat of integra-
tion.
II. CURRENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES CHALLENGING 
NUISANCE LAWS
Part II of this Note analyzes current litigation strategies advo-
cates use to challenge crime-free nuisance ordinances. These litiga-
tion strategies are often based in anti-discrimination protections, 
like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Fair Housing Act. This Section will discuss the limitations 
of these approaches and highlight why advocates should pivot to 
extra-discrimination strategies.
A. Constitutional Violations
Advocates often allege that crime-free nuisance ordinances vio-
late the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, advocates typically allege vi-
olations of the Fourteenth Amendment and First Amendment.
82. See Swan, supra note 25, at 858.
83. See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 3, 16, Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. 
City of Maplewood, No. 4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 
2017) [hereinafter Metro. St. Louis Complaint].
84. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 ACS 5-YEAR POPULATION ESTIMATE: MAPLEWOOD,
MISSOURI, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=maplewood%20missouri&tid=ACSDP5
Y2017.DP05 [https://perma.cc/EYA4-7FRP].
85. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 ACS 5-YEAR POPULATION ESTIMATE: FLORISSANT CITY,
MISSOURI, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=florissant%20city,%20missouri&tid=
ACSDP5Y2010.DP05 [https://perma.cc/636V-RGTV].
86. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 ACS 5-YEAR POPULATION ESTIMATE: FLORISSANT CITY,
MISSOURI, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=florissant%20city,%20missouri&tid=
ACSDP5Y2017.DP05 [https://perma.cc/MY74-PR7N].
87. See FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.453 n.1 (2019).
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1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohib-
its the denial of equal protection of the law.88 Advocates can bring 
claims of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment 
if a crime-free nuisance ordinance was enacted with the purpose 
and intent to discriminate against people of color. The ACLU took 
this approach in 2018 when it filed a lawsuit on behalf of six Black 
renters and a non-profit organization against Faribault, Minnesota.
The Plaintiffs alleged that Faribault enacted its ordinance to re-
duce the number of Black and Somali residents living in rental 
housing within its city.89 To support their claim of intentional dis-
crimination, the Plaintiffs provided direct evidence of racial ani-
mus underlying the ordinance’s enactment.90 The Plaintiffs point-
ed to the legislative record, which documented community 
concerns about “cultural clashes taking place,” the proximity of a 
“very large diverse population,” and ways to handle the growing 
Somali population and the alleged increasing crime rates.91 The 
Plaintiffs also noted the ordinance’s severe discriminatory impact
(“approximately 90% of Faribault’s Black households are renter 
households, as compared to just 28% of non-Hispanic white 
households”92), plus instances of explicit and coded animus from
city officials and community members.93 If the Plaintiffs successfully 
prove that there was intentional discrimination, the ordinance will 
be subject to strict scrutiny analysis and almost certainly struck 
down.94
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 63, 64, 66, Jones v. City of Faribault, No. 18-cv-01643 (D. Minn. 
June 13, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/jones-et-al-v-city-faribault-complaint
[https://perma.cc/TWW7-C96V].
90. Id. ¶¶ 142–48.
91. Id. ¶¶ 143–45.
92. Id. ¶ 150.
93. Id. ¶¶ 149–62.
94. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining that “the purpose of 
strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is 
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool”). While the ordi-
nance could survive strict scrutiny if it is found to be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest,” the Supreme Court has only found a “compelling interest” in two situations: World 
War II and affirmative action. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (World 
War II); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2013) (affirmative action).
In February 2021, the judge in Jones v. City of Faribault granted in part and denied in 
part cross-motions for summary judgment, finding “that the record supports a reasonable 
inference that racial animus was either a motivating factor or the but-for cause in the City’s 
decision to implement the Ordinance.” Jones v. City of Faribault, No. 18-1643, 2021 WL 
1192466, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2021). The court also found that there “remains a genu-
ine dispute of material fact as to whether the City’s policy objectives were legitimate or 
merely pretext to discriminate against Black and Hispanic residents.” Id. Additionally, the 
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A municipality may also violate the Equal Protection Clause if 
the nuisance ordinance treats domestic violence victims—the ma-
jority of whom are women—differently than other crime victims.95
If domestic violence survivors are treated differently than other 
crime victims, the ordinance’s gender-based discrimination is sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny and will be invalid if it is not substan-
tially related to a significant government interest.96
Ms. Watson, also represented by the ACLU, raised two gender-
discrimination claims in Watson v. Maplewood. She argued that (1) 
“Maplewood intentionally discriminated against women when it 
enacted its nuisance ordinance by singling out . . . domestic violence
[calls],” the vast majority of which are placed by women,97 and (2) 
Maplewood discriminated against women seeking police help in 
enforcing its nuisance ordinance against domestic violence victims.98
Ms. Watson alleged that Maplewood’s policy of targeting tenants 
seeking emergency assistance for domestic violence and “treating 
them differently from other [tenants]” did not “advance an im-
portant or legitimate government interest, and is not substantially 
or rationally related to advanc[ing] such an interest.”99
Maplewood responded by filing a motion to dismiss.100 The court
dismissed Ms. Watson’s second “enforcement” gender-
discrimination claim but ruled that her first “enactment” claim 
survived the motion to dismiss.101 While this partial victory may 
have helped Ms. Watson reach a favorable settlement—including 
changes to Maplewood’s ordinance—there are drawbacks to Equal 
Protection claims. If Maplewood refused to settle, Ms. Watson’s 
Equal Protection claim would have been especially vulnerable to 
summary judgment. This is because the ordinance did not explicit-
ly reference gender, even though it singled out domestic violence 
police calls—making it facially neutral. And facially neutral laws 
that have a disparate impact but were not adopted to advance a 
judge found that a factual dispute remained “as to whether Plaintiffs have shown a discrimi-
natory effect caused by the Ordinance.” Id.
95. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1072.
96. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570–71 (1996).
97. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 99 (emphasis added).
98. Id. ¶¶ 76–79.
99. Id. ¶ 102.
100. Reply Memorandum for Defendant in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, Watson v. 
City of Maplewood, No. 4:17-cv-1268-JCH, 2018 WL 1638792 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2018).
101. Watson v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:17CV1268, 2017 WL 4758960, at *6 (E.D. Mo. 
Oct. 20, 2017). Ms. Watson’s second “enforcement” Equal Protection claim was dismissed 
because she offered “no evidence (or even allegation) that Maplewood enforces it Nuisance 
Policy differently for men than women.” Id.
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discriminatory purpose do not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.102
The court itself alluded to this vulnerability in its ruling on 
Maplewood’s motion to dismiss. While Ms. Watson’s allegations 
(partially) survived the motion, the court warned that the “eventu-
al burden is high.”103 After discovery, Ms. Watson would have need-
ed to “present evidence to support her claim that discrimination 
against women was a motivating factor in Maplewood’s decision to 
enact the [crime-free nuisance ordinance].”104 Proving discrimina-
tory purpose is not a simple task, and “requires a showing that the 
law or practice in question was implemented at least in part be-
cause of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group.”105 Since discriminatory intent is exceedingly difficult 
to prove, Ms. Watson may have been forced to make a non-gender 
discrimination “rational basis” argument instead, arguing that the 
ordinance was not rationally related to a legitimate government in-
terest. But Ms. Watson would likely lose this claim because the 
court would presumably find that the Maplewood ordinance was 
enacted for the legitimate interest of protecting the safety of the 
community.106
2. First Amendment Rights
Compared with a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
claim, a First Amendment claim may fare better for plaintiffs alleg-
ing constitutional violations. The First Amendment protects free-
dom of speech and the right “to petition the government.”107 This 
safeguards the right to communicate with law enforcement, includ-
ing reporting a crime or seeking emergency assistance.108 Govern-
ment retaliation in response to an individual exercising her First 
102. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). However, as Ms. Watson argued 
in response to a second motion to dismiss, courts have authorized claims of gender discrim-
ination and domestic violence in the past, “even when the challenged policy or custom did 
not specifically refer to gender.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Watson v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:17-cv-1268-JCH, 2018 WL 1638796 (E.D. Mo. 
Jan. 10, 2018).
103. Watson, 2017 WL 4758960, at *6.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff, 779 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2015)).
106. See Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, for Equal 
Protection claims analyzed under rational basis review, courts will presume the legislation is 
valid and will sustain it if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, 
meaning “any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it”) (citation omitted).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
108. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1071.
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Amendment rights forms a basis for § 1983 liability.109 To establish 
this claim, a plaintiff must show (1) “she was engaged in a constitu-
tionally protected activity,” (2) “that [the government official’s]
adverse action caused her to suffer an injury which would ‘chill a 
person of ordinary firmness from continuing . . . in that activity,’ ”
and (3) “that the adverse action was motivated in part by . . . [the] 
exercise of her constitutional rights.”110
Ms. Watson alleged a First Amendment violation in Watson v. 
Maplewood. When Maplewood enforced its nuisance ordinance, it 
revoked Ms. Watson’s occupancy permit because she made police 
calls reporting domestic violence.111 Ms. Watson argued that 
Maplewood retaliated against her for exercising her freedom of 
speech and right to petition the government.112 Ms. Watson also 
brought a facial challenge against the ordinance, arguing that it
violated the First Amendment on its face by imposing penalties for 
calling the police, “thereby outright burdening tenants’ ability to 
report crime and seek police assistance.”113
First Amendment claims do not have the same barriers as Equal 
Protection claims because there is no discriminatory intent re-
quirement.114 Additionally, any individual whose right to seek 
emergency services has been burdened can bring a First Amend-
ment challenge, regardless of whether or not they belong to a sus-
pect class. However, First Amendment arguments are strongest 
when they are used to attack crime-free nuisance ordinances that 
explicitly sanction police calls. Many crime-free nuisance ordi-
nances do not mention calls to police at all, but instead impose vi-
carious liability on residents tangentially connected to “criminal”
activity under the ordinance.115
Furthermore, the Crime Free Association, an organization dedi-
cated to expanding the use of crime-free programs in rental hous-
ing, has conveniently posted on its website a list of issues that the 
ACLU looks for when evaluating the legality of a crime-free nui-
sance ordinance. The Association puts its viewers on notice that 
the ACLU challenges nuisance ordinances that penalize tenants 
who call the police and tenants who are victims of domestic vio-
109. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002).
110. Id. at 927–28 (quoting Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2001)).
111. First Amended Watson Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 59–75.
112. Id. ¶ 93.
113. Id. ¶ 92.
114. Equal Protection claims require a showing of discriminatory intent, but First 
Amendment retaliation claims only require a showing of retaliatory intent. See Watson v. City 
of Maplewood, No. 4:17CV1268, 2017 WL 4758960, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2017). Fur-
thermore, a First Amendment facial challenge does not seem to require any showing of a 
government intent. See id.
115. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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lence.116 In July 2019, the Florissant City Council amended its 
crime-free nuisance ordinance to add, “[i]t is not the intent of this 
Article and it shall not be construed or enforced in any manner 
which would affect the tenancy of a tenant whose only involvement 
in an incident has been as the victim of a crime.”117
In some ways, the Crime Free Association’s warning and Floris-
sant’s carve-out could be viewed as the successful outcome of years 
of legal efforts to combat harmful nuisance ordinances. It demon-
strates that proponents of crime-free nuisance ordinances are pay-
ing attention to complaints and making changes to protect domes-
tic violence survivors. While this may mitigate the ordinances’ 
detrimental impact on domestic violence survivors described 
above, it still leaves municipalities free to use nuisance ordinances 
to police Black families and prevent integration.
B. Fair Housing Act Challenges
In addition to constitutional challenges, advocates have chal-
lenged crime-free nuisance ordinances under the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA). There are three potential avenues for challenging ordi-
nances under the FHA: intentional discrimination, disparate im-
pact, and segregative effects.
1. Intentional Discrimination
The FHA makes it illegal to deny housing or make housing una-
vailable “to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin”118 or to discriminate “in the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges” for the rental of a dwelling.119 When municipal-
ities enforce their nuisance laws by selectively forcing landlords to 
evict minority groups, they make housing unavailable to these 
groups.120 Similar to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
argument, because domestic violence survivors are disproportion-
ately women, nuisance ordinances can be challenged as discrimi-
natorily applied on the basis of sex.121 The FHA also makes it un-
116. Crime Free Certified Trainer, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-
association.org/trainer_certification.htm [https://perma.cc/6836-F8GC].
117. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.453(C) (2019).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2007).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2007).
120. Smith, supra note 65, at 110.
121. Kastner, supra note 30, at 1069.
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lawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing or to make 
housing unavailable to those with disabilities.122
An FHA claim based on intentional discrimination is called a 
disparate-treatment claim. Like Fourteenth Amendment discrimi-
nation claims, proving disparate treatment under the FHA requires 
establishing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent 
or motive.123 To show discriminatory intent or motive, a plaintiff 
can either rely on direct evidence (e.g., defendant explicitly saying 
that she treated plaintiff differently because of plaintiff’s race) or 
circumstantial evidence (e.g., plaintiff showing that she was treated 
differently than a similarly-situated person of a different race).124
When relying on circumstantial evidence, differential treatment 
supports the inference that the plaintiff was treated differently be-
cause of their race.125 However, gathering direct or circumstantial 
evidence of discriminatory intent may be difficult and is a major 
obstacle to winning disparate-treatment claims.
Around the same time the ACLU and Ms. Watson sued Maple-
wood, the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity 
Council (EHOC) also sued Maplewood, alleging its crime-free nui-
sance ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act.126 EHOC brought a
disparate-treatment claim, alleging that Maplewood intentionally
enforced its nuisance ordinance disproportionately based on race, 
sex, and disability.127 EHOC also alleged that Maplewood did not 
enforce its ordinance even-handedly against all eligible residents 
but instead “enforce[d] the ordinance selectively against those res-
idents whom it deems undesirable for other reasons.”128
The district court held that EHOC failed to state a disparate-
treatment claim under the FHA because EHOC did not identify 
specific instances where the city enforced the ordinance with dis-
criminatory intent.129 The court said that EHOC’s complaint only 
pled conclusory allegations that do not give an inference of dis-
criminatory intent, and that the complaint failed to set forth ex-
amples, for instance, of white residents receiving more favorable 
treatment.130 In order to succeed on a claim of racially discrimina-
122. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
123. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 
524 (2015).
124. CHARLES SULLIVAN & MICHAEL ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 40 (9th ed. 2017).
125. Id.
126. Metro. St. Louis Complaint, supra note 83, ¶¶ 71–78.
127. Id. ¶ 74.
128. Id. ¶ 40.
129. Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood, No. 
4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308, at *10–11 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).
130. Id. at *8–9.
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tory enforcement, EHOC needed not only records showing high 
enforcement rates against communities of color, but also records 
showing Maplewood did not enforce the ordinance against white 
communities for similar behavior.131
2. Disparate Impact
The FHA also allows for “two distinct types of claims that chal-
lenge practices that have a disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities: disparate impact and segregative effects.”132 In Texas De-
partment of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Pro-
ject, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims are cog-
nizable under the Fair Housing Act.133 Under the disparate impact 
theory of liability, a plaintiff “challenges practices that have a ‘dis-
proportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise un-
justified by a legitimate rationale.”134 A prima facie disparate impact 
case is established by evidence of a statistical disparity between 
groups and by showing a “robust causality requirement” linking the 
challenged facially neutral policy to the disparity.135 Once a plain-
tiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants 
to show that the policy is necessary to achieve a valid interest.136
Even if the defendant’s showing is successful, plaintiffs can still win 
by proving an available alternative exists that serves the defendant’s 
legitimate interest.137
The “robust causality requirement” is an obstacle to fighting 
nuisance ordinances under disparate impact claims. Since Inclusive 
Communities, courts have interpreted the robust causality require-
ment as a stringent framework needed to prevent defendants from 
being “held liable for racial disparities they did not create.”138 For 
example, the Eighth Circuit held that “robust causality” means that 
plaintiffs must point to an “‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary’
policy causing the problematic disparity.”139 In the Seventh Circuit, 
a plaintiff claimed that a city’s adoption of a rental unit inspection 
131. See Jarwala & Singh, supra note 11, at 901.
132. Archer, supra note 66, at 217.
133. 576 U.S. 519, 545–46 (2015).
134. Id. at 524 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).
135. Id. at 542.
136. Id. at 527.
137. Id. at 533.
138. Id. at 542 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, superseded by 
statute on other grounds, 42 USC §2000–2k); see, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln 
Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir. 2019); Oviedo Town Ctr. v. City of Oviedo, 759 Fed. 
Appx. 828, 828 (11th Cir. 2018).
139. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1114 (8th Cir. 2017).
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ordinance violated the FHA because it disproportionately bur-
dened landlords with mostly Black and Latino tenants.140 The dis-
trict court, however, ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the ro-
bust causality requirement because the plaintiff did not “lay out a 
chain of inferences explaining how the Ordinance will cause a ra-
cially disparate impact, as distinct from just resulting in a disparate 
impact.”141
Fair housing advocates may struggle to show the robust causality 
requirement when litigating against crime-free nuisance ordinanc-
es. Often, the reason that crime-free nuisance ordinances have a 
disproportionate impact on minority groups is because the ordi-
nances’ vague language allows for discriminatory enforcement by
biased city officials.142 If courts hold that discriminatory enforce-
ment is not itself caused by the nuisance ordinance, plaintiffs will 
struggle to make a prima facie showing of disparate impact.
In its lawsuit against Maplewood, EHOC alleged that the city’s 
ordinance had a disparate impact on “non-white residents, women, 
and people with disabilities.”143 EHOC gathered data on forty-three 
nuisance violation hearings in Maplewood over a five-year peri-
od.144 For hearings where the household’s race could be ascer-
tained, more than fifty-five percent of the tenants were Black, de-
spite Black people making up only seventeen percent of 
Maplewood’s population.145 The court did not find EHOC’s statisti-
cal evidence sufficient to establish robust causation. The court stat-
ed that, “at best,” EHOC’s evidence showed “an imbalance result-
ing from enforcement of the ordinance.”146 Consequently, EHOC’s 
disparate impact claim was rejected for failing to state a claim un-
der the FHA because it did not plausibly allege that the nuisance 
ordinance caused a disparity.147
140. TBS Grp., LLC v. City of Zion, No. 16CV5855, 207 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183060, *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017).
141. Id. at *24–25.
142. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
143. Metro. St. Louis Complaint, supra note 83, ¶ 74.
144. Id. ¶ 25.
145. Id. ¶ 26. EHOC also found that sixteen of the forty-three enforcement actions were 
due to incidents of domestic disturbance, six of which involved a woman being attacked by a 
man. Id. ¶ 29. It found that eleven of the enforcement actions involved tenants seeking 
emergency services because of mental illness or other disabilities. See id. ¶ 35–37.
146. Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood, No. 
4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017) (emphasis 
added).
147. Id. at *13–15.
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3. Segregative Effects
In addition to prohibiting policies that have a disparate impact 
on protected groups, the FHA also restricts actions that have seg-
regative effects—policies and practices that create, increase, rein-
force, or perpetuate segregated housing patterns.148 The same bur-
den shifting framework used with disparate impact claims applies 
to segregative effects claims. To establish a prima facie segregative 
effects claim, a plaintiff must “(1) challenge a distinct practice or 
policy of the defendant; (2) use statistical evidence to show that 
the identified practice creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates 
segregated housing patterns in the relevant community; and (3) 
establish that the challenged practice is the cause of the segrega-
tive effect.”149
The segregative effects theory is primarily employed against 
municipalities using their zoning powers to prevent integrated 
housing developments in predominantly white communities.150
The segregative effects provision has not yet been tested against
crime-free nuisance ordinances, but it has the potential to be more 
successful than disparate impact claims.151 Unlike disparate impact 
claims, which focus on a particular policy, segregative effects claims 
can challenge both individual housing decisions and broad poli-
cies.152 The Maplewood district court dismissed EHOC’s disparate 
impact claim because the disproportionate outcome was a result of 
the discretionary enforcement of the nuisance ordinance, rather than 
the policy itself.153 Alleging segregative effects instead of disparate 
impact would allow the plaintiff to target the discriminatory en-
forcement of the ordinance by arguing that, cumulatively, this 
practice perpetuates segregation.154
The segregative effects theory may be promising, but it is not a 
silver bullet. While courts have accepted relatively simple census 
data to prove a segregative effects claim,155 showing severe segrega-
tion seems to be a prerequisite for a successful claim.156 In Avenue 
148. Archer, supra note 66, at 217 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2018)).
149. Id. at 218–19.
150. Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 709, 713 (2017).
151. See Archer, supra note 66, at 219.
152. Id. at 219–20.
153. Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council v. City of Maplewood, No. 
4:17CV886 RLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202308, at *13–14 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).
154. See Archer, supra note 66, at 220.
155. Schwemm, supra note 150, at 738–39; see, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977).
156. Schwemm, supra note 150, at 764; see, e.g., Arlington Heights, 558. F.2d at 1291 n.9 
(finding that a city that is 99% white is evidence of “overwhelming” racial segregation).
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6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a 
summary judgment ruling against the plaintiffs’ segregative effects 
claim.157 The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the 
city’s refusal to rezone land for a predominantly Hispanic devel-
opment had segregative effects because “Hispanics [were] not a 
minority in Yuma; they actually constitute[d] 55% of the popula-
tion.”158 Under this reasoning, a segregative effects claim against 
Florissant’s crime-free nuisance ordinance would likely fail because
the city’s census data reflects increased integration over the last ten 
years.159 This suggests that a segregative effects claim may not be 
the best strategy to preemptively tackle a crime-free nuisance ordi-
nance implemented in a fairly integrated city.
In addition to the legal standards discussed above, advocates 
must consider the psychological obstacles to bringing claims under 
anti-discrimination laws. Psychology studies show that even when 
there is significant evidence of invidious discriminatory intent, 
most people—including judges and jurors—refuse to attribute the 
behavior to discrimination.160 Professor Katie Eyer theorizes that 
separating the legal inquiry from direct allegations of discrimina-
tion will help plaintiffs avoid psychological obstacles preventing
successful anti-discrimination claims.161 Rather than attempting to 
expand existing anti-discrimination doctrine, advocates should 
look to extra-discrimination remedies to alleviate the disparate im-
pact of crime-free nuisance ordinances. Part II discussed First 
Amendment challenges, which is one extra-discrimination remedy 
used to combat crime-free nuisance ordinances. Part III explores 
another extra-discrimination litigation strategy: conflict preemp-
tion by state laws that protect tenants’ rights to their rental hous-
ing.
III. CONFLICT PREEMPTION AND CRIME-FREE 
NUISANCE ORDINANCES
Crime-free nuisance ordinances are pervasive and deeply prob-
lematic. These policies are detrimental to vulnerable communities, 
157. 818 F.3d 493, 513 (9th Cir. 2016).
158. Schwemm, supra note 150, at 733 (quoting Ave. 6E Invs. v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-
cv-00297 JWS, 2013 WL 2455928, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2013)).
159. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
160. Eyer, supra note 1, at 1278–79.
161. Id. at 1280–81, 1346 (“Because the operative issue under [extra-discrimination 
remedies] is not whether a particular individual has been discriminated against—but rather 
whether the . . . facts presented can fulfill . . . statutory or judicial requirements—the diffi-
cult and psychologically contingent question of whether discrimination truly took place 
need not be resolved.”).
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but they are often disguised by a legitimate local need to protect 
the general welfare of the city and promote safety in rental hous-
ing.162 Without pressure from communities or litigation brought by 
advocacy groups, it seems that there is not much standing in the 
way of municipalities creating these laws. As discussed in Part II, 
there are multiple constitutional and statutory claims advocates use 
to challenge these ordinances, but there are limitations to each. 
Part III discusses an overlooked protection that can be used to 
challenge crime-free nuisance ordinances: state landlord-tenant 
laws. This Part explores whether excessively broad crime-free nui-
sance ordinances are preempted by state eviction laws and recom-
mends that tenants’ advocates align with landlord associations to 
fight these ordinances.
A. Conflict Preemption Doctrine: The Limits of Municipal Police Power
Municipalities derive their law-making powers from the state leg-
islature or state constitution. There are two leading doctrines that 
define the scope of municipal legislative powers: Dillon’s Rule and 
home-rule. Under Dillon’s Rule, the powers of a municipality only 
include powers enumerated by the state’s constitution, statutes, or 
charter.163 The majority of states, however, have home-rule provi-
sions.164 Home-rule provisions are state constitutional or statutory 
provisions that give localities the power to adopt their own munic-
ipal charters and regulations, subject to the laws and policy of the
state.165 In contrast to Dillon’s Rule, cities governed by home-rule 
do not depend on the state legislature for authority and instead 
have power directly from the state constitution.166
As part of their home-rule authority, municipalities are often 
empowered to declare and abate public nuisances by enacting or-
dinances.167 This power exists under the municipality’s general po-
162. See Simeone-Casas, supra note 15.
163. 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:10 (3d ed., 
rev. vol. 2019). The powers enumerated include (1) powers expressly conferred, (2) powers 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and (3) powers 
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality. See also 56 AM. JUR. 2D,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, ETC. § 163 (2020).
164. Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1129 
(2012).
165. 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1:43 (3d ed., 
2019).
166. 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:18 (3d ed., 
2019).
167. 6A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:67 (3d ed., 
2019).
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lice power.168 Municipal police power allows for local regulation 
and legislation to preserve public peace, health, morality, and wel-
fare.169 Although these are issues of general state concern, they are 
often local in nature and appropriately dealt with through local 
laws. However, local control over nuisance abatement is not limit-
less—municipalities’ legislating powers are limited by state and 
federal laws.170
Preemption doctrine establishes a priority between potentially 
conflicting laws enacted by various levels of government.171 Munici-
pal ordinances are subordinate to state laws.172 This means that 
municipal ordinances must be in harmony with state law, and if 
there is any conflict between a municipal ordinance and state stat-
ute, the statute preempts the ordinance.173 While preemption doc-
trine varies by state, generally preemption of a municipal ordi-
nance by a state law can be express or implied.174 This Note focuses 
on one type of implied preemption—conflict preemption—which 
exists if the municipal ordinance irreconcilably conflicts with or 
stands as an obstacle to the execution of the full purpose of a state 
statute.175
Under conflict preemption doctrine, a municipal ordinance en-
acted pursuant to local police power is invalid if it conflicts with a 
general law of the state.176 For instance, a municipal ordinance is 
preempted by state law when a right or benefit expressly given by 
the state law has been curtailed or taken away by the ordinance.177
Courts examining potential conflict preemption look to the lan-
guage of the local ordinance and state statute, and ask whether the 
direct consequences of the local ordinance render illegal what is 
168. Id.
169. Id. § 24:1.
170. Id. § 24:72.
171. 5 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15:18 (3d ed. 
2019).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 15:19.
174. Id. Express preemption occurs where the state statute explicitly bars local govern-
ment from acting on a particular issue. Id. Implied preemption can occur through field 
preemption or conflict preemption. Field preemption is found where an entire statute is so 
comprehensive that the general assembly intended to occupy the entire field completely so 
that no local ordinances on the issue are permitted. Id.
175. Id.
176. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 163, § 109. In this context, “general law” is defined as 
“part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment,” must “apply to all parts of the 
state and operate uniformly throughout the state,” must “set forth police, sanitary, or similar 
regulations,” rather than only granting or limiting the “legislative power of a municipal cor-
poration to establish those types of regulations,” and must “prescribe a rule of conduct on 
citizens generally.” Id. at n.4.
177. MCQUILLIN, supra note 171, § 15:19.
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specifically allowed by state law.178 This Note discusses whether 
crime-free nuisance ordinances irreconcilably conflict with and 
stand as an obstacle to the rights created by state landlord-tenant 
laws.
B. Conflict Preemption Applied to Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances
Advocates who use conflict preemption to fight crime-free nui-
sance ordinances should first review state landlord-tenant statutes 
to discern tenants’ rental protections under state law. Second, ad-
vocates must look to the state’s constitution and case law to deter-
mine whether conflict preemption claims are available in that 
state, and if so, the applicable conflict preemption test. Finally, ad-
vocates must compare state law eviction grounds with crime-free 
nuisance ordinance eviction grounds to determine potential con-
flict. This Section performs this analysis using crime-free nuisance 
ordinances in Iowa and Missouri as an example.
1. State Landlord-Tenant Laws Create Rights for both 
Landlords and Tenants
The purpose of landlord-tenant laws is to delineate the rights 
that accompany rental agreements. These laws protect both land-
lords and tenants, and every state has a landlord-tenant statute that 
includes the legitimate reasons for evicting tenants.179 For example, 
all landlord-tenant laws provide a remedy for landlords when their 
tenants fail to pay rent.180
States diverge, however, regarding procedural protections given 
to tenants during the eviction process, as well as which tenant be-
haviors can lead to eviction. In Iowa, for example, state law offers a 
“notice to cure” provision when a tenant’s actions put them at risk 
of eviction.181 Landlords must give tenants the opportunity to 
178. Id.
179. See Richard A. Leiter & William S. Hein & Co., Leases and Rental Agreements, in 50
STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (2016); Thompson Reuters, Unlawful Detainer, in 50 STATE 
STATUTORY SURVEYS (2020).
180. See Thompson Reuters, Unlawful Detainer, in 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (2019).
181. AMBER DESMET, IOWA LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 24 (2012) (citing 
IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A, 562B.25(1)) (“The landlord is required to deliver a written notice 
to cure the breach to the tenant which also specifies when the rental agreement will termi-
nate if the breach is not remedied.”); see also IOWA CODE § 562A.27A (2014) (providing that 
a tenant must be given an opportunity to remedy a violation if criminal activity was commit-
ted by a co-tenant or guest).
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“cure” the issue before they can pursue an eviction.182 This state law 
“notice to cure” provision may be curtailed by municipal crime-free 
nuisance ordinances.183 In Missouri, state law provides four ways 
that a landlord can terminate a tenancy outside those established 
in a lease.184 If a St. Louis County ordinance demands the eviction 
of a tenant for reasons not authorized in the Missouri statute, the 
ordinance may infringe on tenants’ rights and conflict with state 
law.
2. Conflict Preemption Standard
As explained above, conflict preemption occurs when a local law 
is irreconcilable with a state statute. The precise legal standard for
conflict preemption varies state-to-state, but it is generally quite 
demanding. In both Iowa and Missouri, for example, a municipal 
ordinance is unavoidably irreconcilable with the statute—and 
preempted by it—when the ordinance prohibits what the statute 
permits, or permits what the statute prohibits.185 However, Iowa 
courts are required to interpret state law in a manner that renders 
it harmonious with the ordinance, if at all possible.186 Furthermore, 
Iowa courts must presume the ordinance is valid,187 and the conflict 
182. Some states do not provide an opportunity for tenants to cure the issue before a 
landlord can pursue an eviction. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-1 (providing no opportunity 
for a tenant to remedy a breach prior to a landlord initiating eviction proceedings).
183. See, e.g., Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920, at 16
(Dist. Ct. Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content
/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-
CWVS] (holding that conflict preemption applies where a crime-free nuisance ordinance 
lacks a notice to cure provision, thus rendering the ordinance irreconcilable with state law). 
The court in Landlords of Linn County also held that the ordinance’s extended grounds for 
eviction were irreconcilable with state law. Id. This particular application of conflict preemp-
tion doctrine is discussed in more detail below. See infra Section III.B.3.
184. First, landlords can terminate a month-to-month lease by giving the tenant one 
month’s notice, requiring the person in possession to vacate the premises. MO. REV. STAT. § 
441.060. Second, landlords can terminate a year-to-year lease by giving notice of intention to 
terminate at least sixty days before the end of the year. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.050. Third, a 
landlord can evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. MO. REV. STAT. § 535.020. Fourth, a 
landlord can terminate the lease if the tenant uses the property for certain illegal purposes. 
See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 441.020, 441.740. The fourth avenue will be discussed in more detail 
below.
185. See City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1990) (quoting City of 
Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1983)); Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of 
St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Mo. 2017) (quoting Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape 
Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)).
186. City of Des Moines, 457 N.W.2d at 342.
187. Iowa Grocery Indus. Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, 712 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa 2006).
826 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:3
must be “obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable de-
bate.”188
The Missouri conflict preemption test is similarly stringent. Or-
dinances are presumed to be valid and lawful.189 Furthermore, 
there is no conflict preemption when a municipal ordinance simp-
ly supplements a state statute, such as when the municipality pro-
hibits more than the state prohibits.190 Although this Note focuses 
on Iowa and Missouri, similar conflict preemption tests also apply 
in other states, including Minnesota,191 Maryland,192 New York,193
and Pennsylvania.194
3. Challenging Crime-Free Nuisance Ordinances with 
Conflict Preemption Doctrine
In Iowa, a group of landlords successfully challenged a Cedar 
Rapids crime-free nuisance ordinance, arguing that the ordinance 
conflicted with state law establishing the grounds for eviction.195
The Cedar Rapids ordinance required residential rental agree-
ments to include a crime-free lease addendum.196 The crime-free 
lease addendum was overly broad, requiring landlords to pursue 
eviction when residents or anyone affiliated with the residents en-
188. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920, at 1 (Dist. Ct. 
Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads
/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-CWVS].
189. See Coop. Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 578.
190. Id. at 583.
191. Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Man-
gold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 143 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1966)) (stating that 
conflict preemption “exists between state law and municipal regulation when the law and 
the regulation ‘contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each other,’
when ‘the ordinance permits what the statute forbids,’ or when ‘the ordinance forbids what 
the statute expressly permits.’ ”).
192. Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Chaney Enter., 165 A.3d 379, 395 n.19 
(Md. 2017) (stating that conflict preemption exists when a local ordinance prohibits what 
the state permits or permits what the state prohibits).
193. People v. Torres, 108 N.Y.S. 3d 269, 271 (App. Term 2019), leave to appeal granted, 34 
N.Y.3d 1163, 2020 WL 1187072 (2020) (stating that if local laws do not prohibit what the 
state law permits nor allow what the state law forbids, the local law is not inconsistent with 
state law. There is no conflict preemption when a local law merely provides a greater penalty 
than the state law.).
194. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp. v. City of Lancaster, 214 A.3d 639, 648 (Pa. 2019) (quoting 
Harris-Walsh Inc. v. Borough of Dickson City, 216 A.2d 329, 333–34 (Pa. 1966)) (stating that 
conflict preemption exists, and an ordinance is invalid, if it stands as an obstacle to the exe-
cution of the full purpose of a law enacted by the General Assembly). To explore the con-
flict preemption standards in other states, see MCQUILLIN, supra note 171, § 15:19.
195. Swan, supra note 25, at 883.
196. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920, at 1 (Dist. Ct. 
Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads
/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-CWVS].
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gaged in certain enumerated crimes, including misdemeanors.197
The ordinance allowed the city to punish a landlord who did not 
enforce the crime-free addendum by revoking or suspending their
rental license.198 Iowa’s landlord-tenant law, however, permits lease 
termination when a tenant creates a clear and present danger to 
others.199 The court held that the Cedar Rapids ordinance was 
preempted by state law.200 Because the grounds for eviction under 
the ordinance were broader than those found in the state statute, 
the ordinance interfered with a protection provided by the state, 
thus rendering the ordinance irreconcilable and unenforceable.201
A similar argument could be applied in St. Louis County, where 
crime-free nuisance ordinances coerce landlords to evict tenants 
based on certain proscribed behaviors. Parts of Missouri’s landlord-
tenant statute allow or require landlords to evict tenants when they
or someone associated with them engages in illegal acts on the 
premises. If a tenant uses the property for certain illegal purposes, 
the lease becomes void and the landlord may take possession of 
the property after providing a ten-day written notice to vacate.202
Specific illegal purposes include: using the premises as a brothel; 
prohibited gaming; or allowing the illegal possession, sale, or dis-
tribution of controlled substances on the property.203 Additionally, 
the statute allows immediate eviction of a tenant when emergency 
situations arise that would cause physical injury or extensive prop-
erty damage, or when drug-related criminal activity occurs.204 The 
197. Id. at 1, 16.
198. Id. at 1.
199. Id. at 12–13.
200. Id. at 16.
201. Id.
202. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.020 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 441.040 (1997) (providing that
landlords may repossess the premises after issuing ten days’ notice to violators of § 441.020).
203. Id.
204. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.740 (1997). The statute provides for expedited eviction when:
(1) An emergency situation where dispossession of the tenant by other, less expedi-
tious means would . . . cause . . . (a) Physical injury to other tenants or the lessor,
or (b) Physical damage to lessor’s property and the reasonable cost to repair such 
damage exceeds an amount equal to twelve months of rent; . . . (2) Drug-related 
criminal activity has occurred on or within the property leased to the tenant; (3) 
The property leased to the tenant was used to further, promote, aid or assist in drug-related 
criminal activity; (4) The tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a guest 
has engaged in drug-related criminal activity either within, on or in the immediate vicinity 
of the leased property.
Id. (emphasis added). The statue also provides for expedited eviction when:
(5) The tenant has given permission to or invited a person to enter onto or re-
main on any portion of the leased property, and the tenant did so knowing that 
the person had been removed or barred from the leased property . . . or (6) The 
tenant has failed to promptly notify the plaintiff that a person whom the plaintiff 
previously had removed from the property leased by the tenant, with the 
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statute allows an “interested party” to pursue eviction if the land-
lord or appropriate prosecuting attorney fails to do so.205 This part 
of the statute resembles some crime-free nuisance ordinances be-
cause it allows the municipality or neighborhood association to 
pursue eviction even if a landlord chooses not to. However, the 
state law allows this in very limited and extreme circumstances.206
If a city in St. Louis County, like Florissant, has a crime-free nui-
sance ordinance that is not closely tailored to the grounds for evic-
tion provided by the Missouri statute, it may be void due to conflict 
preemption. Determining whether conflict preemption applies re-
quires comparing Missouri law and the municipal ordinance(s).
Under Florissant’s crime-free nuisance ordinance, a landlord may 
be required to evict a tenant or have its renter’s license suspended 
if any member of the household, guest, or another person under 
the resident’s control commits (or is believed to have committed) 
any number of activities.207 Chapter 210 of the Florissant Municipal 
code, referenced in Florissant’s crime-free nuisance ordinance, in-
cludes over one hundred offenses.208 Any of these offenses, even if 
committed just once, can trigger the crime-free nuisance ordi-
nance. This is true regardless of whether the offense occurred on 
or near the property. The triggering offenses range from littering 
knowledge of the tenant, has returned to, entered onto or remained on the prop-
erty leased by the tenant.
Id.
205. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.730 (2011) (defining an “interested party” as “any incorpo-
rated, not-for-profit neighborhood association or community-based organization which rep-
resents the well-being and interests of the community where the leased property is located”).
206. See MO. REV. STAT. § 441.740 (1997) (listing grounds for expedited eviction); MO.
REV. STAT. § 441.730 (2011) (defining non-landlord, non-prosecuting attorney “interested 
parties” who may pursue eviction).
207. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(a)–(i) (2019). The activities that would 
require eviction include:
a. A felony crime . . . on or in the immediate vicinity of the residence; b. A Class A 
misdemeanor . . . in the immediate vicinity of the premises; c. Any criminal activi-
ty that threatens the health or safety of, or the right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
premises by other residents; d. Any criminal activity that threatens the health or 
safety of, or the right to peaceful enjoyment of their residents or persons residing 
in the immediate vicinity of the premises; e. Any violent criminal activity at or in 
the immediate vicinity of the premises; f. Any drug-related criminal activity on or 
in the immediate vicinity of the premises; g. Any abuse of drugs or alcohol that 
threatens health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of other residents on the 
premises or persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises; h. Viola-
tion(s) of the offenses set forth in Chapter 210 of the Florissant Municipal Code; 
or i. Violation(s) of nuisance provisions set forth in Chapter 213 of the Florissant 
Municipal Code.
Id.
208. See FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 210.020–210.2290 (2020).
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and use of a hand-held wireless communications device while driv-
ing to kidnapping and assault.209
Still, there are parts of the Florissant crime-free nuisance ordi-
nance that are consistent with Missouri law. Paragraph (f),210 for in-
stance, almost mirrors the proscribed offense in Missouri Revised 
Statute § 441.740(2)–(4)—any drug related criminal activity on or 
in the immediate vicinity of the property. Paragraphs (c)–(e)211 are 
also arguably in harmony with Missouri Revised Statute § 
441.740(1) (if the criminal activity complained of would cause phys-
ical injury or significant property damage). However, Florissant’s 
inclusion of (a), (b), (h), and (i)212—which includes hundreds of 
offenses—vastly extends the list of tenant behavior beyond what is 
proscribed by Missouri Revised Statute §§ 441.020 and 441.740. In 
doing so, the municipal ordinance permits eviction where the stat-
ute prohibits it, thus interfering with a state-granted protection.
Florissant might defend its crime-free nuisance ordinance as 
simply supplemental, arguing that requiring an eviction based on a 
broader category of disruptive behavior merely prohibits more 
than what the state prohibits, and is therefore not preempted. 
There are two issues with this argument. First, municipal expan-
sion of liability on a subject regulated by state law creates an irrec-
oncilable conflict that renders the ordinance void and unenforce-
able.213 Nuisance ordinances expand liability by vastly extending 
the potential grounds for eviction. Second, to supplement state law 
by prohibiting more than what the state prohibits, the municipal 
ordinance must serve the same purpose as the state law.214 Land-
lord-tenant laws are intended to protect the rights of both land-
lords and tenants. Crime-free nuisance ordinances contradict this
purpose by evicting tenants for a wide range of activities. Crime-
free nuisance ordinances do not simply prohibit more activity than 
209. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 210.580, 210.530, 210.170, 210.110 (2019).
210. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(f) (2019).
211. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(c)–(e) (2019).
212. FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 605.461(a), (b), (h), (i) (2019).
213. See Edwards v. City of Ellisville, 426 S.W.3d 644, 650, 663 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) 
(holding that the city ordinance’s strict liability for vehicle owners whose car was recorded 
running a red-light is in conflict with state law, which only regulates driver and pedestrian
conduct. The municipality’s expansion of liability permits penalization of persons who are 
neither drivers nor pedestrians for running a red light, while the state statute prohibits such 
penalization.).
214. See Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 583–84 (Mo. 2017) 
(holding that a city ordinance setting the minimum wage higher than the state minimum 
wage is not preempted because it serves the same purpose of the state law: to ameliorate the 
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee and to protect the rights of 
workers). Since the state minimum wage was not intended to protect employers, the city’s
ordinance simply supplements the state law by setting additional local limits on the mini-
mum amount an employer can pay an employee. Id.
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state law—they contravene tenants’ rights to their rental housing as 
provided by state law.
4. Limitations of Conflict Preemption as a Litigation Strategy
Conflict preemption is a promising tool to combat crime-free 
nuisance ordinances. However, given the stringent requirements 
for conflict preemption, it would not work as a catchall litigation 
strategy against crime-free nuisance ordinances. For instance, a 
nuisance ordinance may be so vague that it could easily coerce an 
eviction in conflict with state law, yet on its face does not explicitly 
expand the grounds for eviction.215 Because the standard for con-
flict preemption sets a high bar, challenging crime-free nuisance 
ordinances under conflict preemption will likely be most successful 
when used against municipalities that require crime-free lease ad-
dendums —such as Cedar Rapids—or when the ordinance coerces 
landlords to evict tenants for minor offenses—like in Florissant.
Furthermore, conflict preemption may not be an option in some
states. The home rule provisions in Illinois’ and Montana’s consti-
tutions effectively rule out implied preemption arguments.216 In Il-
linois, the home rule provision states that “[h]ome rule units may 
exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or 
function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assem-
bly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or 
specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.”217 The 
Montana Constitution provides that “a local government unit 
adopting a self-government charter may exercise any power not 
prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter.”218 The Montana 
Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that “only ex-
press statutory provisions preempt ordinances of a self-governing 
municipality.”219
Even if a state’s constitution allows for conflict preemption, the 
state’s courts may be resistant to conflict preemption claims.220 In
Texas, for example, the constitution’s home rule provision states 
that no ordinance “shall contain any provision inconsistent with 
215. See UNIVERSITY CITY, MO., MUN. CODE §§ 220.020, 220.040, and 220.060 (2016). 
Although the nuisance ordinance is very broad and gives city officials unrestrained discre-
tion, it does not expressly target tenants.
216. 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4:13 (2020).
217. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
218. MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
219. MARTINEZ, supra note 216, § 4:13 n.6 (citing D & F Sanitation Serv. v. City of 
Billings, 713 P.2d 977, 982 (Mont. 1986)).
220. See id. § 4:13.
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the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the 
Legislature of this State.”221 But the Texas Supreme Court held that 
“[t]he intention of the Legislature to impose limitations” on the 
power of home rule cities must “appear with unmistakable clari-
ty.”222 This means that while Texas allows conflict preemption on 
paper, Texas courts do not seem eager to apply the doctrine to 
strike down municipal laws in practice. Therefore, claims based on 
conflict preemption may be effective in many places but will not be 
possible in all states.
C. Implementation Recommendations: Opportunity for a Unique Alliance
This Note has primarily discussed the harms crime-free nuisance 
ordinances cause vulnerable populations and the ways tenants and 
civil rights and fair housing advocates can sue municipalities. Ten-
ants, however, are not the only people aggrieved by these ordi-
nances; landlords also have a stake in this fight. Some landlords 
may support crime-free nuisance ordinances because they provide 
an excuse to evict “troublesome” renters. But because nuisance or-
dinances are typically enforced by sanctioning landlords, the ordi-
nances tend to be unpopular among lessors.223 Landlords may turn 
to litigation to solve this problem.224 While tenants have the most to 
lose—literally their homes—municipalities force the hands of land-
lords by threatening to revoke their renters’ license or fine them if 
they do not cooperate.225 Landlords and tenants are unlikely allies, 
often with conflicting interests. However, crime-free nuisance or-
dinances create a unique situation where landlords and tenants 
share a common opponent: the municipality. Tenants’ rights advo-
cates should consider collaborating with landlord groups and real-
ty associations to fight these ordinances. Furthermore, rather than 
selecting individual plaintiffs who have been directly affected by 
the ordinance, tenants’ advocates and landlords’ associations 
should rely on organizational standing to bring suits to dismantle 
these laws.
221. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
222. Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 532 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1975)
(quoting City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1964)).
223. See Kastner, supra note 30, at 1057; Gavin, supra note 63, at 275 (“[T]he ordinances 
have proven to be unpopular with both tenants and landlords, resulting in a plague of law-
suits against the municipalities that adopt such ordinances.”).
224. See, e.g., Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. EQCV069920 (Dist. 
Ct. Linn Cnty. July 1, 2011), http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads
/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-6-11.pdf? [https://perma.cc/K368-CWVS]. See 
also supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
832 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:3
By coordinating their efforts, tenants’ advocates and landlords’ 
associations can access more information and fund their litigation 
more efficiently.226 Collaboration may also help to avoid working 
towards contradictory objectives, instead pushing both groups to 
focus on their common goals.227 If tenants’ advocates take on this 
fight alone, landlords’ associations might move to intervene in law-
suits, seeking different outcomes. For example, landlords may want 
to fight crime-free nuisance ordinance penalties but may neverthe-
less voluntarily include crime-free lease addendums. Tenants’ ad-
vocates should be wary of potential landlord intervention and pro-
actively seek to form early alliances with landlords against munici-
municipalities, rather than end up in a three-way legal battle.
In addition to the pragmatic benefits of coordination, joining ef-
forts may put plaintiffs in a better position to mitigate counterar-
guments to conflict preemption claims. For example, defendant 
municipalities may argue that conflict preemption claims should 
not be accepted because they suggest that any non-statutory reason 
for eviction or lease termination is impermissible. This implication 
seemingly contradicts the state statute’s intent. After all, Missouri 
state landlord-tenant laws do not claim that the enumerated 
grounds are the only grounds for eviction—such an explicit prohi-
bition would prevent landlords from evicting tenants for lease vio-
lations. However, landlords and tenants together can argue that state 
law establishes a list of presumptive rights—not an exclusive list of 
eviction/lease termination grounds—and that they are free to ne-
gotiate a lease modifying their state statutory rights. For example, a 
landlord and tenant are free to agree that pets are prohibited on 
the premises and that the lease will be terminated if the tenant 
does not adhere to this term.
The freedom to contract around presumptive rights poses a 
problem, however, when landlords choose to include a crime-free 
addendum in their leases. Such an addendum is a place where 
landlords and tenants’ interests diverge, and the fragile alliance 
may dissolve. Furthermore, a landlord’s power over lease terms 
and a tenant’s inability to bargain for more protections in the lease 
leaves tenants vulnerable to housing instability. Despite these po-
tential conflicts of interest, collaborating may still be the most ef-
fective and efficient way to tackle the problem presented in this 
Note: municipalities enforcing facially neutral crime-free nuisance 
ordinances in a way that disparately impacts vulnerable popula-
tions and inhibits racial integration. Even if landlords and tenants 
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cannot overcome their differences to form an alliance, both 
groups should explore conflict preemption as an extra-
discrimination legal doctrine to challenge burdensome crime-free 
nuisance ordinances.
CONCLUSION
Crime-free nuisance ordinances are facially neutral laws that 
have been discriminatorily enforced by municipalities. Because 
there are many obstacles to using anti-discrimination protections 
to challenge these laws, advocates should expand their strategies to 
include creative, extra-discrimination solutions to tackle these or-
dinances. Advocates across the country should examine their 
state’s landlord-tenant laws and preemption doctrine to determine 
whether conflict preemption is a viable option to combat crime-
free nuisance ordinances in their cities.

